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Furthermore, it has been held by the Federal courts that for purposes of
taxation, the bonds of a city similar to this are actually obligations of the
city, and interest payments are not to be taxed by the United States. It may
be seen, therefore, that for purposes other than debt limitations, the bonds
may be considered obligations of the city.
Thus the words in the statute implying in some way that the city is trustee
for the bondholders are merely for the purpose of denying the city the right
to use these funds for other than payment of the bonds for which they are
collected and for segregation purposes in the city's duties, rather than in
changing the relationship between the city, bondholders, and property owners.
The court was clearly right in holding the city liable to the bondholders for
all the money collected in by prepayments which the city had lost by poor
investments and bank failures as well as the funds misappropriated to pay
other bondholders. W. E. B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-City ordinance provided that distribution of literature
within the city limits without permit from the City Manager constituted a
nuisance and could be punished as an offense against the city. Petitioner
distributed religious pamphlets within the city limits without the required
permit, and was convicted under the ordinance. She claimed the ordinance
prevented the free exercise of her religion, free speech and free press, and thus
was a violation of the fourteenth amendment. On appeal, reversed. Held: the
ordinance was invalid on its face obviating the necessity of obtaining a per-
mit. Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938), 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666.
The Constitution of the United States, as well as the Constitutions of the
several states, protect free speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religious
worship. However, just as the right of assemblage is protected by the con-
stitutions, yet not made absolute,1 these constitutional guaranties are not
absolute.2 Where the restriction does not amount to a denial of the right and
is a reasonable exercise of the police power, the ordinance will be sustained. 3
Likewise, certain common law limitations existing at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution are valid.4  Thus, nuisances may be abated; 5 certain
1 Commonwealth v. Abrahams (1892), 156 Mass. 57, 30 N. E. 79; State v.
Frear (1910), 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W. 961; People v. Young (1934), 136 Cal.
App. 699, 29 P. (2d) 4-40, discussed in 23 .California L. Rev. 180.
2 "Liberty of speech, and of the press, is also not an absolute right . .
Near v. Minnesota (1930), 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625; Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations (8th ed.), 876, 884; Frohwerk v. United States (1919), 249 U. S.
204, 39 S. Ct. 249; State v. McKee (1900), 73 Conn. 18, 46 A. 409, 49 L. R. A.
542; People v. Most (1902), 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175.
3 "The rights (free speech, free press, etc.) . . . are all subject to such
reasonable regulations as the governing body of the government may make for
the general good . . .," Thomas v. Indianapolis (1924), 195 Ind. 440, 145
N. E. 550, 35 A. L. R. 1194; Scheanck v. United States (1919), 249 U. S. 47,
39 S. Ct. 247; Near v. Minnesota (1930), 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625; Abrams
v. United States (1919), 250 U. S. 616, 40 S. Ct. 17.
4 Speaking of common law limitations on free speech, Ch. J. Parker of
Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Blanding (1825), 3 Pick. 304, said: "The
common law therefore is left unimpaired by the constitution . . .'; Jones v.
Townsend (1885), 21 Fla. 431 (libel); Atwood's Case (1617), 79 Eng. Repr.
359 (blasphemy) ; Rex v. Wilkes (1770), 98 Eng. Repr. 327 (obscene literature).
5 "The abatement of a nuisance, though infringing other rights, may be
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defamatory publications may be prohibited where a property interest is in-
volved; 6 obscene literature and pictures may be interdicted; 7 and other acts
may be forbidden when the safety of the community is concerned,8 even
though the enforcement of these duties tends to limit the freedom of speech,
press and worship.
The enactment of ordinances to achieve these objectives is not an unreason-
able limitation of religious liberty.9  It would seem, therefore, that the
ordinance in the instant case might have been supported. The petitioner by
placing pamphlets on private property was a trespasser, and the pamphlets
could have been deemed a nuisance.1 0 The removal of the pamphlets would
justifiable when the interests of society demand." Milwaukee v. Kassan (1931),
203 Wis. 383, 234. N. W. 352 (political and economic handbills) ; Harwood v.
Trembley (1922), 97 N. J. L. 173, 116 A. 430 (speeches in a public street)
In re Debs (1895), 158 U. S. 564, 15 S. Ct. 900, 39 L. ed. 1092 (calling strike)
Goldblatt v. East Chicago (1936), 211 Ind. 621, 6 N. E. (2d) 331 (distribution
of advertising handbills) ; Dziatkiewicz v. Maplewood Twp. (1935), 115 N.
J. L. 37, 178 A. 205 (distribution of religious pamphlets) ; Hart v. People
(1882), 26 (N. Y.) Hun. 396 (publication of gambling information).
6 "Redress for mere personal slander or libel may perhaps properly be left
to the courts of law . . .; but statements and charges intended to frighten
away a man's customers, and intimidate them from dealing with him, may
wholly break up and ruin him financially, with no adequate remedy if a court
of equity cannot afford protection by its restraining writ." Shoemaker v. The
South Bend Spark Arrester Co. (1893), 135 Ind. 471, 35 N. E. 280 (claiming
patent rights of another) ; Evenson v. Spaulding (1907), 150 F. 517 (interfer-
ence in selling customers); Dixon v. Holden (1869), Law Reports, 7 Equity
Cases 488 (threatened publication of statements which would injure plaintiff's
business) ; but see Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott (1275), 10 Chancery
Appeals 142 (publication of information about plaintiff's business).
7 "In excluding various articles from the mail, the object of Congress has
not been to interfere with the freedom of the press, or with any other rights of
the people, but to refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed
injurious to the public morals." In re Jackson (1877), 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. ed.
877; In re Rapier (1891), 143 U. S. 110, 12 S. Ct. 374, 36 L. ed. 93 (lottery
matter); Duncan v. United States (1931), 48 F. (2d) 12S (broadcasting pro-
fanity) ; Clark v. United States (1914), 211 F. 916 (obscene publications).
8 "There is no question but that the state may thus provide for the punish-
ment of those who indulge in utterances which incite to violence and crime
and threaten the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means.
There is no constitutional immunity for such conduct abhorrent to our institu-
tions." Stromberg v. California (1930), 283 U. S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 73 A.
L. R. 1484 (communistic propaganda).
9 "Congress is deprived of all legislative power over mere religious opinions,
but is left free to reach actions which are in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order." Reynolds v. United States (1879), 98 U. S. 145
(polygamy); State v. Chandler (1837), 2 Harr. (Del.) 553 (blasphemy);
Meuendorff v. Duryea (1877), 69 N. Y. 557 (desecration of the Sabbath);
People v. Pierson (1903), 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243 (medical aid com-
pulsory); Commonwealth v. Plaisted (1889), 148 Mass. 375, 19 N. E. 224
(beating drums restricted) ; State v. Neitzel (1912), 69 Wash. 567, 125 P. 939
(communicating with departed spirits) ; Peterson v. Widule (1914), 157 Wis.
641, 147 N. W. 966 (certificate of freedom from venereal disease required
as condition of marriage).
1ODziatkiewicz v. Maplewood Twp. (1935), 115 N. J. L. 37, 178 A. 205;
Coleman v. Griffin (1936), 55 Ga. App. 123, 189 S. E. 427, appeal dismissed
in (1937), 302 U. S. 636, 58 St. Ct. 23; Milwaukee v. Kassen (1931), 203 Wis.
383, 234 N. V. 352; In re Anderson (1903), 69 Neb. 686, 96 N.W. 149, 5 Ann.
Cas. 421; Goldblatt v. East Chicago (1936), 211 Ind. 621, 6 N. E. (2d) 331;
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burden both the property owners and the city. Both had a duty to prevent
fire hazards and to maintain adequate sanitation standards. The ordinance
might have been upheld, then, as a reasonable exercise of the police power.
Furthermore, one of the main purposes of the religious guaranties in the
Constitution was the prevention of religious persecution. 1 1  Although some
restraint was imposed on individual rights, it scarcely seems that there was
a denial of them.
Nevertheless, although individual actions must conform to a certain degree
to the standards set to govern the conduct of society generally,', the
Supreme Court evidently felt that ordinances of this kind were too fraught
with the possibility of destroying personal liberty. By protecting circulation
as well as publication and by including leaflets along with newspapers and
periodicals the instant case is a further extension of the great protection
accorded by the Constitution to the freedom of religion, speech, and the press.
The Court is loathe to recognize a social interest to justify any regulation in
the direction of censorship.13  I. D. B.
MORTGAGES-SuBROGATION--VoLUNTEER.--Plaintiff bank advanced money to
discharge a mortgage on certain land at the request of the mortgagor. Such
land was also subject to a dower charge, subordinate to the mortgage by prior
agreement. A new mortgage was executed to the plaintiff bank, and con-
temporaneous therewith the mortgagor agreed to procure a quitclaim deed
or postponement of the lien of the dower charge in favor of the plaintiff bank.
Subsequent attempts by the mortgagor to perform this agreement were un-
availing. The holders of the dower charge obtained a judgment on their
claim and for the satisfaction of which seek to have the land sold. This is
a suit by the plaintiff bank to restrain such sale, and a prayer that it be
subrogated to the position of the mortgagee whose lien had been discharged
by the plaintiff's .advances. From the lower court's dismissal of the bill,
plaintiff appeals. Held: Affirmed. Subrogation will not be decreed for a mere
volunteer. Union Joint Stock Land Bank of Detroit v. Byers (1939), 100
F. (2d) 82.
Subrogation is said to be a remedial doctrine based on considerations of
equity and good conscience applied broadly, as may best serve the purposes
of natural reason and justice.'
Being a concept of such variable nature, it is obviously futile to attempt a
specific enumeration of the instances wherein the doctrine will be invoked.
However, the restrictions imposed on its applicability admit of being cata-
logued.
There must be a full and complete payment of the debt due the creditor
to whose position the payor seeks to be subrogated.2 One primarily obligated
San Francisco Shopping News Co. v. South San Francisco (1934), 69 F. (2d)
879, writ of certiorari denied in 293 U. S. 606, 55 S. Ct. 122, 79 L. ed. 697.
11 Willis, Constitutional Law, 502.
12 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), 968.
13 Near v. Minnesota (1930), 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625; Grosjean v.
American Press Co. (1936), 297 U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444.
1 Davis v. Schlemmer (1897), 150 Ind. 472, 50 N. E. 373.
2 Vert v. Voss (1881), 74 Ind. 565.
